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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law - Criminal Law - Habeas Corpus
Relief Available Where Prisoner Serving Consecutive Sentences
Rowe was imprisoned in the Virginia State Penitentiary after being convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty and twenty years.
While serving the first sentence, which he did not contest, Rowe petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for state habeas corpus
relief, but the petition was denied. Rowe then unsuccessfully applied to
the federal district court, again contending that the second conviction
was unconstitutional.' The district court's refusal was based on an application of McNally v. Hill,' which had held that habeas corpus is not available unless a prisoner is in custody under the actual sentence which he
alleges to be unlawful. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that it would no longer follow McNally.' Held,
affirmed: Habeas corpus relief is available even though a prisoner, serving
consecutive sentences, has not yet begun to serve the sentence which
constitutes the alleged unlawful restraint. Peyton v. Rowe, 36 U.S.L.W.
4462 (U.S. May 20, 1968).
The habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts is set forth in 28
U.S.C. section 2241. This statute is similar to that which was controlling
at the time McNally was decided 5 in that it requires a person to be "in
custody" before a writ of habeas corpus may issue. In McNally the Court
interpreted "in custody" to mean that where habeas corpus relief is sought,
the prisoner must be serving the actual sentence which constitutes the alleged unlawful restraint.
In Rowe the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren,
overturned McNally on two general grounds: (1) there had been no clear
precedent for the rule in the first place, and (2) its "premature attack
rule" did not effectuate the true purposes of the writ of habeas corpus.
In concluding that there was no historical precedent for the McNally
rule, the Court pointed out that the decision had relied upon the history
of the writ in England prior to 1789. The Court in McNally had been
unable to discover any instance where the writ had been used to secure a
judicial determination where a favorable decision could not have resulted
in the prisoner's immediate release. In Rowe the Court observed that such
an historical search had necessarily proved futile in light of the fact that
'Rowe's contention was fourfold: (1) that he had been subjected to double jeopardy; (2) that
his plea of guilty had been involuntary; (3) that the indictment had failed to state an offense;
and (4) that his trial counsel had been inadequate.
2293 U.S. 131 (1934).
3 Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (1967). The Fourth Circuit consolidated Rowe's appeal with
another case involving dismissal, on the basis of McNally, of a petition attacking later, consecutive
sentences.
428 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1965) provides: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to
a prisoner unless . . . he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."
5
Rev. Stat. § 753 (1875).
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prior to 1789 English judges had no power to hand down cumulative sentences in felony cases. The Court further observed that the McNally decision had not been compelled by statute. The Court pointed out that the
holding had rested partially on the premise that actual physical release
from custody is the only relief available in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Since 1875, however, the habeas corpus statute' has granted the federal
courts power to provide for relief other than immediate release, such as a
determination of the facts and a disposition of the case as the interests of
justice may require. The Court's decision also touched upon the ambiguous
meaning of the word "custody" in 28 U.S.C. section 2241 (c) (3). The
Court remarked that "in common understanding 'custody' comprehends
• . . the entire duration of imprisonment." 7 Practically speaking, and for
purposes of parole eligibility under Virginia law,' Rowe is in custody for
fifty years, or for the aggregate of his thirty- and twenty-year sentences. The practical consideration of earlier parole eligibility' is compelling and becomes significant with respect to the Court's reasoning that immediate physical release is not the only remedy under the statute.
In examining McNally against the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court emphasized its three major characteristics: (1) providing
post-conviction relief; (2) prompt adjudication of the validity of the
challenged restraint; and (3) a determination on the merits of alleged
deprivation of constitutional rights."0 The Court felt that McNally had an
undermining effect on all three purposes. It pointed out that McNally's
challenge to the legality of his detention had been directed at the face of
the indictment and that any postponement of adjudication of his claim
probably would not have resulted in the loss of any important evidence.
Rowe's situation is thus clearly distinguishable. Any lengthy lapse of time
could seriously hinder his ability to prove facts and call witnesses in support of his contentions, and could hinder the state in prosecuting, should a
new trial be necessary. The Court concluded that, in order to provide for
swift judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints, the writ must be avail-

able "at the earliest practical time."' 1
By overruling McNally the Supreme Court has responded to the inequities inherent in the old rule. Where parole is available to a prisoner at an
earlier date, the practical consequences of Rowe will relieve the harsh results obtained in the past.
S.R.S.
6

Rev. Stat. § 761 (1875), superseded by 28 U.S.C. 2243 (1965).
U.S.L.W. at 4465.
VA. CODE ANN. § 53-251 (1967).
'The Court points out that under the two sentences Rowe will be eligible for parole in 1974.
736
8

If relieved of the twenty-year term, however, Rowe would be eligible for parole four years sooner,
in 1970.
'0 The Court pointed out that it had recognized in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1963),
that "a district court was authorized to look behind the bare record of a trial proceeding and conduct a factual hearing to determine the merits of alleged deprivations of constitutional rights-a
procedure that reached full flowering in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)." 36 U.S.L.W.
at 4464.
1 36 U.S.L.W. at 4465.
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Constitutional Law - Federal Abstention
Enjoin State Prosecutions

-

Refusal To

Plaintiffs were participants in a three-day riot in 1967 in Nashville,
Tennessee, which began after two policemen ejected a Negro soldier from a
restaurant for disorderly conduct. The police had been called by the Negro
operator of the restaurant. Three of the plaintiffs were charged with violation of a disorderly conduct statute,1 a "dangerous weapons" statute, and
the common law offense of inciting to riot. These three and eight others'
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the state prosecution and
to have a declaratory judgment striking down the criminal statutes. They
alleged: (1) that the arrests and prosecutions were not in good faith and
would have a "chilling effect" on their federal rights and (2) that the
statutes were void for vagueness and overbreadth. Held, dismissed: Where
there is no evidence that irreparable harm has resulted from state prosecutions or that a state court is unable or unwilling to protect a litigant's
constitutional rights, federal courts will not enjoin state proceedings.
Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
Although the court's decision was based in part on a finding that this
was an improper class action' and that certain of the named plaintiffs were
without standing to challenge the statutes in question,' the court's opinion
concentrated on the power of the court to grant the injunction. In Dombrowski v. Pfister' such an injunction issued because merely defending
against the state's criminal prosecution would not have assured adequate
vindication of constitutional rights and the state action in itself would
have had a "chilling effect" upon the plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional rights.' The rioters in the present case primarily relied upon this
Supreme Court decision, which had held the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law unconstitutional on their face. However, the three-judge panel
in Brooks determined that the holding of Dombrowski would not compel
similar relief enjoining prosecution of the three plaintiffs and striking
down the Tennessee statutes for several reasons.
First of all, the factual pattern of violence and lawlessness in Brooks was
1TENN.

CODE ANN.

§

TENN.

CODE ANN.

§

2

'Of

39-1213 (Supp. 1967).
39-4901

(1955).

the three plaintiffs who were arrested, all were Negroes, two were field secretaries of the

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee

(SNCC)

and one was a student at Tennessee State

University in Nashville. Of the eight additional plaintiffs, seven were Negroes and included one
priest, six students and Stokely Carmichael, the National Chairman of SNCC, whose speeches at
the nearby universities had been made without interference from the defendants. A taped radio
program interviewing Carmichael was not played by the Library Board of the metropolitan govern-

ment because of the riot. The district court found that this decision was made in good faith and in
the proper exercise of discretion vested in the local officials. Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538,
545 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
" The class consisted of Negro residents and students of Nashville. The court found no evidence
of pending or threatened prosecutions against any persons other than the three plaintiffs and four
others. This small number did not meet the requisites of FED. R. Civ. P. 23. 274 F. Supp. at 547.

a The court held that the eight plaintiffs who had not been arrested or threatened with arrest
were not injured by the operations of the challenged statutes. Id.
6380 U.S. 479 (1965).
7Id. at 485.
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a far cry from the constitutionally protected activity of peaceful organization involved in Dombrowski. There the Supreme Court found that the
peaceful organization had been harassed and threatened by the state authorities in order to dissuade the members from their civil rights activities.
In Brooks the good faith of the police was demonstrated by the evidence,
i.e., the arrests arose out of violence, only restrained force was used to contain the riot, and there was no harassment.
Secondly, the court in Brooks rejected the plaintiffs' contention of the
"chilling effect" of the prosecutions on their constitutional rights as
"wholly self-serving and without justifiable factual support."8 The court
remarked that there had been no showing of irreparable injury and held
that if the challenged statutes were indeed void for vagueness or overbreadth, "the state courts are fully capable of so ruling, and there is no
reason in this case to suppose that they would not do so."' This reasoning
is in line with that of Zwicker v. Boll."° In that case, the plaintiff was being prosecuted in state court for non-violent, but offensive and disorderly
conduct during a demonstration. He was denied the injunction he sought
in federal court for two reasons: (1) because the state prosecution had
already been instituted, and (2) because there was no convincing proof
that the state prosecution would have a "chilling effect" on his constitutional rights. The court also stated that "it should be presumed, unless
clearly shown to the contrary, that state courts will deal as carefully with
federal rights as would we."'"
Another reason compelled the court in Brooks to abstain from enjoining the state prosecution. Arrest and formal charging with an offense were
said to constitute "proceedings" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2283."2
This statute" denies federal courts the power to stay proceedings in a state
court except as expressly authorized by acts of Congress. The court considered the contention that the Federal Civil Rights Act 4 constitutes such
an "expressly authorized" exception. This contention had also been raised
in Dombrowski and Zwicker, but the Supreme Court in the former case
specifically left the question undetermined," and the district court in the
latter denied the injunction on other grounds." While acknowledging that
there is a split of authority on the question,"' the district court in Brooks
8 274 F. Supp. at 549.
9id.
10270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
'lid. at 137.
"274 F. Supp. at 553.
s328 U.S.C. 2283 (1965). "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
'442 U.S.C. 1983 (1965).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
'5 380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
18270 F. Supp. at 135.
"'Holding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1965) constitutes an expressly authorized exception to 28

1968 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

held that the Civil Rights Act does not constitute such "express authorization" and that to so hold would "create a vast exception to section 2283
and would do violence to the principles of comity and federalism which
underlie it."'"
Brooks clearly reflects the reluctance of federal courts to interfere with
the adjudication of matters in state courts. In light of the evidence of lawlessness and violence which led to the arrest of the three plaintiffs and with
no evidence of bad faith on the part of police, the district court gave
proper heed to the abstention doctrine.
S.D.B.

Constitufional Law

-

National Firearms Act

-

Privilege

Against Self-Incrimination Provides Full Defense to Prose-

cution for Failure To Register or for Possession of an Unregistered Firearm
Haynes was charged in federal district court with violating 26 U.S.C.
section 5851 by possessing a sawed-off shotgun which had not been registered with the Secretary of the Treasury, as required by 26 U.S.C. section 5841. Before trial Haynes moved to dismiss, asserting that section
5851 violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The motion was denied, and a judgment of conviction was entered on a
plea of guilty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Haynes' conviction.' Held, reversed: A conviction under section 5851 is not properly distinguishable
from a conviction under section 5841 for failure to register, and the hazards of incrimination created by the statutory requirement that certain
firearms be registered are real and appreciable. Therefore, a proper claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination provides a full defense to a prosecution under section 5841 for failure to register a firearm and under section 5851 for possession of an unregistered firearm. Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
The National Firearms Act' is an interrelated statutory system for the
taxation of certain classes of firearms.' Failure to comply with any of the
4
Act's requirements is made punishable by fines and imprisonment. As
U.S.C. 2283 (1965) are Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930
(1963); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1956); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873
(S.D. Miss. 1966). Contra, Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Tribune Review
Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
18274 F. Supp. at 553.
' Haynes v. United States, 372 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967).
226 U.S.C. §§ 5801-49 (1954).
'The Act's requirements are applicable only to shotguns with
rifles with barrels less than 16 inches long; other weapons made
overall length of less than 26 inches; machine guns and other
silencers; and other firearms, except pistols and revolvers, if such
cealed on the person. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 5848(1).
426 U.S.C. § 5861 (1954).

lessthan 18 inches long;
barrels
or shotgun with an
from a rifle
automatic firearms; mufflers and
weapon is capable of being con-
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part of the statutory scheme, section 5841 requires every person possessing
a firearm subject to the Act to register his possession with the Secretary of
the Treasury, unless he made the weapon, or acquired it by transfer or
importation in compliance with the Act's requirements. Section 5851
creates a series of offenses. It declares unlawful the possession of any firearm which has at any time been transferred or made in violation of the
Act's provisions, or which has not been registered as required by section
5841. Prior to the instant case, in Russell v. United States,' section 5841
had been declared unconstitutional insofar as its application to the facts
required an individual to incriminate himself. However, in subsequent
cases brought for illegal possession of an unregistered firearm under section 5851, Russell was distinguished on the basis of the Government's contention that the two offenses, despite the similarity of their statutory descriptions, serve entirely different purposes. The Government argued that
the registration clause of section 5851 is intended to punish acceptance of
the possession of a firearm which, despite the requirements of section 5841,
was never registered by any prior possessor, while section 5841 punishes
only a present possessor who has failed to register the fact of his own possession.! In the present case, the Supreme Court examined for the first
time, and in the face of uniform holdings below,7 the issue of whether
enforcement of section 5851 against a defendant is constitutionally permissible if conviction under section 5851 is not meaningfully distinguishable from a conviction under section 5841 and if registration under section 5841 would provide information incriminating to the registrant.
In construing section 5851, the Court observed that the statutory language did not support the Government's contention that the "failure to
register" pertinent to a charge under section 5851 must precede the receipt of the firearm by the accused so as to distinguish the two sections.
Likewise, the pertinent legislative history did not avail of such an interpretation. Of seemingly controlling significance to the Court was the fact
that the offense under section 5851 was defined by incorporating section
5841 which, in turn, unequivocally declared the "failure to register" in
question to be that of the possessor.
5 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962). Accord, Dugan v. United States, 341 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1965);
McCann v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 751 (D. Colo. 1963); United States v. Fleish, 227 F. Supp.
967 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
eSee, e.g., Pruitt v. United States, 364 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1966); Castellano v. United States,
350 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1965); Taylor v. United States, 333 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1964); Starks
v. United States, 316 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1963); Frye v. United States, 315 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.
1963); Capooth v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Hazelwood v. United States,
208 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
7But see Lovelace v. United States, 357 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1966), holding that an indictment
requiring proof not simply that the defendant had a firearm which no one had registered, as in
Frye v. United States, 315 F.2d 491 (1963), but also requiring proof that the defendant himself
had not registered the gun, had applied § 5851 in an unconstitutional manner.
a1n construing § 5851, the Court distinguished the "making" and "transfer" clauses of the
section from the "failure to register" clause. Therefore, Haynes should not affect decisions under
§ 5851 upholding convictions for receiving or possessing "any firearm which has at any time been
transferred . . . or made" in violation of the Act's requirements. See, e.g., Decker v. United States,
378 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1967) (transfer); United States v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1965)
(shipment); Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963) (making); Mares v. United
States, 319 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1963) (making).
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For two reasons the hazards of incrimination stemming from the registration requirements of section 5841 were understood to inhere in prosecutions under section 5851: (1) because the possession of a firearm and a
failure to register were determined to be equally fundamental ingredients
of both offenses, the Court found the Government's propounded distinction between a section 5851 "possession" prosecution and a section 5841
"failure to register" prosecution to be without merit; (2) in addition, the
Court failed to accept the theory that section 5841 created a status of un-

lawful possession which, when voluntarily assumed by an individual, is not
subject to the constitutional privilege in a section 5851 prosecution. The
Court declared that even the violation of a statute that expressly stated

that its violation would constitute a waiver of the constitutional privilege
would not suffice to deprive an accused of the privilege's protection.

In determining, in accord with courts below,- that registration would
compel a defendant to provide information incriminating to himself, the

Court considered that the requirement was principally directed at persons
who were already in possession of a firearm in violation of other require-

ments of the Act and would thus be immediately threatened by criminal
prosecution." Because convictions would be facilitated by the formal acknowledgment of possession and supplementary information, the hazards

of incrimination were termed "real and appreciable.""
The Court's logic in piercing the semantic veil and prohibiting the
Government from doing indirectly what it could not do directly seems
compelling. Furthermore, the effective regulation or taxation by Congress

of firearms need not be sacrificed for the sake of this logic. The Court
indicated that a provision affording complete immunity against future
prosecutions based on the information furnished would suffice to enable
registration requirements under the National Firearms Act to function."
Thus, only the use of the tax statutes for criminal prosecution is precluded." And, despite the fact that Haynes was part of a tripartite attack on
registration statutes,' the holding should not expose registration require9See

note 5 supra.

0 The risks of incrimination created by the registration requirements are not remote. Heike v.

United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896). In determining that the registration requirements were principally directed at persons inherently suspect
of criminal activities, the Court cited Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (registration
requirements directed at highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities) and noted
that the types of weapons covered (see note 3 supra) and the type of information requested, e.g.,
whether the registrant had ever been convicted of a felony, made the application of sections 5841
and 5851 very pointed.
" Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
"As a guide in this area, the Court cited Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
The Court thought the "required records" doctrine of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948),
inapposite because, inter alia, records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept
were not involved.
" The Court declined to permit continued enforcement of §§ 5841 and 5851 by imposing restrictions upon the use by state and federal authorities of information obtained. Since Congress had
provided that 26 U.S.C. § 6107, requiring the keeping of a list for public inspection of the names
of all persons paying particular taxes, should apply, at least in part, to taxes paid under the National Firearms Act, the Court decided to leave it to Congress to strike a balance between federal
treasury considerations and prosecutory considerations.
""See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968), both decided on the same day as Haynes.
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ments in general to challenge because the facts limit its application to acts
which are principally directed to a highly select group and requiring admission of past or current statutory violations."1
C.D.T.

Constitutional Law

-

"One Man, One Vote" Applied to

Units of Local Government
In Texas the "general governing body of the county"' is the commissioners court. These courts are empowered, among other things, to appoint
minor local officials, administer the county's public welfare services, set
the county tax rate, adopt the county budget, build roads, bridges,2 and
hospitals' within the county, and to determine the districts for the election
of their own members.' In Midland County, the five-member commissioners court had established the following districting plan: one member was
elected at large from the entire county; the other four members were chosen from four districts having populations of 67,906, 852, 414, and 828.
This tremendous imbalance was created because virtually the entire city of
Midland, the county's only urban center, was placed in a single district.
Petitioner Avery, a resident and taxpayer of Midland County, sued the
commissioners court in a Texas district court, contending that the district
imbalance violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although the district court ruled
in favor of Avery, it did not mention the fourteenth amendment. Instead,
the court found that the districting plan was not "for the convenience of
the people,"' as required by the Texas Constitution. The court of civil appeals reversed this judgment,' but the Texas Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court,7 holding that under the Texas and United States Constitutions the districting plan was not allowable "for the reasons stated by
the trial court."" However, the Texas Supreme Court further ruled that
the districts did not have to have substantially equal populations and noted
that other factors' could be considered in determining the size of the
various districts. Avery petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
"The Court distinguished United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259
information obtained in connection with regulatory programs of general
to the time factor, the Court declared in Marchetti that the force of the
is not diminished "merely because confession of a guilty purpose precedes
sequently employed to evidence." 390 U.S. at S4.
'Interpretive Commentary, TEx. CoNST. ANN. art. V, § 18.

(1927) as pertaining to
application. However, as
constitutional prohibition
the act which it is sub-

2 Id.
'TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4492, § 1
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18.
5 Id.
'Avery v. Midland County, 397 S.W.2d 919
7
Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422
'Id. at 425.
I.e., number of qualified voters, land areas,
values.

(1966).

(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
(Tex. 1966).
geography, miles of county roads, and taxable
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certiorari. Held, reversed: Avery had a right to a vote for the commissioners court of substantially equal weight to the vote of every other
county resident, and the districting plan, with its unequally populated
districts, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Avery v. Midland County, 88 S.
Ct. 1114 (1968).
In the landmark 1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims" the Supreme Court determined that the equal protection clause requires state legislatures to be
apportioned on the basis of population. However, in 1967 in Sailors v.
Board of Education" the Court refused to apply this "one man, one vote"
rule to a procedure for choosing a county school board that placed the selection of the county board's members with school boards of towns within
the county, even though the component boards had equal votes and served
unequal populations. In Sailors the Court based its decision in part on the
"nonlegislative character" of the school board's functions, but a far more
important facet of the decision was the Court's finding that the school
board selection procedure was "basically appointive rather than elective."
Thus, Sailors in fact dealt with the question of whether a state must in
every instance provide for the election of local officials, rather than whether
the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims must be met when a state provides
for the election of a local government agency. Nevertheless, Sailors' language in regard to the administrative nature of the school board cast doubt
upon the applicability of the "one man, one vote" principle to local governmental bodies which combine both legislative and administrative functions." Ostensibly, Avery v. Midland County removes these doubts.
In Avery the respondent county contended that unequal districts should
be permitted for the commissioners court because the court was not "sufficiently legislative" in its functions. However, the Supreme Court firmly
rejected this argument. Noting that Texas commissioners courts perform
legislative, administrative, and judicial functions, the Avery majority set
out the test for determining whether the "one man, one vote" rule applies

to local governmental bodies: districts for units of local government having "general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served
by the body"" must be apportioned on the basis of population. In rejecting
the county's argument that the apportionment plan should be sustained
because the commissioners court was primarily concerned with county
government, the majority reserved for future determination the question

of whether local legislative bodies may be apportioned so as to give greater
influence to the persons most affected by their functions.
"0377 U.S.

533 (1964).
"387 U.S. 105 (1967).
1"However, with the exceptions of Avery and Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141
N.W.2d 98 (1966), state courts have held the principles of Reynolds v. Sims applicable to units
of local government. See Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857 (1965);
Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164 (1966); Hanlon v. Towey,
274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741 (1966); Armentrout v. Schooler, 409 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1966);
Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965); Bailey v. Jones,
81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132
N.W.2d 249 (1965).
"Avery v. Midland County, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 1120 (1968).
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Whether the Avery test is a viable one remains to be seen. Strong dissents 4 criticized the majority's failure to take cognizance of the need for
flexibility in the selection of local governmental units. However, with
Sailors still on the books some experimentation is still permitted, because
states will be required to meet the "one man, one vote" requirement only
when they provide for the election of local government units and only
when a single-member districting process is involved in the election proce-

dure.'" "Basically appointive" means of selection should continue to be allowed." Although the ambiguity of the term "general governmental powers" may cause the courts some problems, the term appears broad enough
to include virtually every form of local government."
L.D.S.

Criminal Law -

Death Penalty Imposed by Jury, but Not
by Judge, Unconstitutional

Defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury for violating the Federal Kidnapping Act.' The Act provides that a person who knowingly
transports in interstate commerce any unlawfully kidnapped person, shall
be punished by death if the victim is not released unharmed and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend. The trial court dismissed the indictment, holding the entire statute unconstitutional because it impaired the
constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution.! The government appealed directly to
the Supreme Court.' Held, reversed: The provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, imposing a death penalty only upon the defendant who asserts
his right to trial by jury, violates the fifth and sixth amendments because
it discourages the defendant from exercising his constitutional right to
demand a jury trial and to plead innocent; but since the death penalty is
severable, the entire statute is not unconstitutional, and the indictment
need not be dismissed even though the death penalty cannot be imposed.
United States v. Jackson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4277 (U. S. Apr. 8, 1968).
In reaching its conclusion that the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act is unconstitutional, the Court found that a defendant
" Justices Stewart, Fortas, and Harlan each wrote a dissenting opinion.
15In a 1967 case, Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967),

the Supreme Court upheld a city

council election procedure which included at large voting for the candidates, some of whom had
to reside in particular districts.
"But see Bianchi v. Griffing, 393 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1968), where the Second Circuit concluded that a selection procedure similar to that of Sailors was elective rather than appointive.
" Indeed, the Avery majority opinion refers to school boards, city councils, and county governing boards and specifically notes that the Midland County Commissioners Court is typical of
most local governing units.
'18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1965).
'United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
818 U.S.C. § 3731 (1965).

1968 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

who elects trial by jury is subjected to a potentially greater punishment
than a defendant who pleads guilty or waives jury trial.' Since, indirectly,
the statute encourages guilty pleas and discourages the desire for trial by
jury, the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights are needlessly impaired. The government had argued that the statute does not subject a
defendant in a jury trial to any greater risk, first of all because the judge,
as final arbiter of the sentence, is not bound by the recommendation of
the jury.' In answer, the Court noted that not once since the inception
of the Act has a judge disregarded the jury's death penalty recommendation.' In addition, the Court construed the language of the statute as a
clear congressional mandate removing the judge's discretion to disregard
the jury's recommendation.! A second argument posed by the government
was similarly rejected. The government contended that any greater risk
accompanying a jury trial was negated by the fact that the trial judge
could find a defendant guilty or accept a guilty plea and subsequently empanel a special jury solely for the purpose of prescribing sentence s The
Court, however, concluded that the statute does not authorize empanelling
a special jury.'
The statute, merely by encouraging a defendant to plead guilty and
thereby to escape any possibility of a death sentence, infringed upon the
defendant's fifth amendment right not to plead guilty. The Court reasoned
that a guilty plea, pursuant to the statutory inducement, is coercive and
violative of due process.'" The government urged that federal judges may
reject guilty pleas and involuntary waivers of jury trial. But, the consequences of such a rejection would "force all defendants to submit to trial,
however clear their guilt and however strong their desire to acknowledge it
in order to spare themselves and their families the spectacle and expense of
protracted courtroom proceedings."" In his dissenting opinion, Justice
White stated that the Court could have properly interpreted the statute
so as to avoid constitutional questions by simply requiring the trial judge
to examine carefully all guilty pleas and waivers of jury before accepting
them in order to determine whether the death penalty power was a relevant factor in the defendant's decision."
The Court departed from its traditional avoidance of constitutional issues and stretched far to strike down the death penalty provision. The
Court's departure may have been a result of a continuing effort to abolish
4 37 U.S.L.W. at 4281.
5id. at 4278.
6Id.
Id. at 4279. The Court reasoned that the wording of the statute, "if the verdict of the jury
shall so recommend," was an imperative and the judge was without authorization to disregard the
recommendation.
8 Id.
' The Court interpreted "the verdict of the jury" as excluding any other jury but the trial
jury to designate sentence. The Seventh Circuit has construed the same part of the statute to mean
"a jury" including a jury convened solely to determine sentence. Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d
742, 748 (7th Cir. 1938). See also Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146, 153 (W.D. Ky.
1967).
'o37 U.S.L.W. at 4281 n.20.
"Id. at 4281.
11id. at 4284.
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the death penalty altogether."5 But it may nevertheless be justified in
Jackson because the kidnapping statute can be easily amended to prevent
any impairment of constitutional rights by either requiring a jury determination of sentence regardless of how guilt is determined or by authorizing the judge as well as the jury to assess the death penalty.
S.R.H.

Estate Tax ceeds

-

Community Property and Life Insurance Pro-

What, Again?

Mortimer was named as primary beneficiary of an insurance policy on
the life of Margaret, his wife. The policy, which was taken out during
marriage, contained a blank to be signed by the person designated as owner
of all "benefits, values, rights and privileges." Mortimer signed in the
designated blank. Premiums were paid with community funds. At Margaret's death, Mortimer did not include any of the proceeds of the policy in
his wife's estate tax return, but the Commissioner objected. Mortimer and
the Commissioner agreed that, under section 2042 of the Code, proceeds of
an insurance policy are subject to estate tax to the extent of ownership retained by the person whose life is insured. But they disagreed as to the
ownership retained by Margaret in the instant policy. Claiming that Margaret had made a gift of the property to him, Mortimer paid the asserted
deficiency and sued for a refund, but it was denied by the district court.
Mortimer appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Held, affirmed: Where community
funds are used to pay premiums on a policy of life insurance taken out
during marriage, thereby causing its characterization as community property under Texas law, a gift will not be found from the fact that the insured wife designated her beneficiary husband as "owner," for such designation is assumed to be merely for the purpose of acting as the agent of
the community. Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
Under section 2042 of the Code' the test for determining the includability of life insurance proceeds in the estate of an insured is whether "the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership" such as
"the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan,
"See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 36 U.S.L.W. 4504 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1968), where the Court voided
a death penalty imposed by a jury because the jury did not contain a person who was opposed to
the death penalty.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042 (proceeds of life insurance):
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by all . . . beneficiaries [other than the executor] as insurance under policies on
the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death
any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with
any other person.
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or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the
policy, etc." 2 The regulations further provide that, "As an additional step
in determining whether or not a decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy or any part of a policy, regard must be given to the effect
of the State or other applicable law upon the terms of the policy."' In
looking to state law, the Commissioner in the instant case determined, correctly, that life insurance policies purchased during marriage, and paid for
with community funds, are community property in Texas.
Mortimer's main contention was that Margaret had made a gift of her
portion of the community policy to him when she "gave" him the ownership of the benefits of the policy. The court, assuming that in Texas the
wife is capable of making a gift of her community interest,' did not find
the requisite donative intent necessary to make an inter vivos gift. Mortimer's wife had not performed an affirmative act, such as an instrument of
assignment or deed of trust, which would clearly reflect such an intent.
The court pointed out that mere non-interference is insufficient evidence
of a gift. Moreover, there was no express clause purporting to transfer the
policy to Mortimer's separate estate.
After Mortimer's case, it appears doubtful whether estate taxes can be
avoided on benefits of life insurance policies taken out during marriage
and paid for with community funds. The court assumed the real question
in the case: If the insured is the wife, does she have the power to make a
gift of community property to her husband?5 A conveyance of the interest
of the insured to the other spouse, clearly indicating donative intent,
would be effective if the insured was the husband, if the insured survived
the conveyance by more than three years,6 and if the insured had some
interest to convey at the time of the conveyance. A partition of commun2Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(2)

(1958).

8Id. § 2042-1(5).
'In looking to state law the Commissioner had found no guarantees that such gifts were possible. Although dicta in King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947), suggested that either
spouse may give to the other as separate property any part of the community property, it was questionable whether the wife, at the time of the Freeman case, could do so. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4621 (Supp. 1967), effective January 1, 1968, gives joint management rights to the
spouses over non-special community property. Whether this new statute will permit a wife to make
a gift of community property to her husband will be a crucial question in future estate planning.
Mortimer also claimed that TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4619, § 6 (repealed 1968), which gave
the wife the power to control, manage, and dispose of any insurance policy, conferred on her the
clear right to make a gift to him of her community interest in the policy. And, by virtue of having
been allowed to sign as owner, Mortimer concluded that he was the owner of the entire property
interest. The Fifth Circuit, however, was of a different opinion because art. 4619 did not expressly
state that the wife could make a gift of a community interest. At any rate, the statute was inapplicable because Mortimer, not his wife, had the management rights under the policy. TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 3.49-3 (Supp. 1967), effective January 1, 1968, is the continuation of TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4619, § 6 (repealed 1968). It states that: "A spouse shall have right, control
and disposition of any contract of life insurance or annuity heretofore or hereafter issued in his
or her name or to the extent provided by the contract or any assignment thereof without the
joinder or consent of the other spouse."
5 See note 4 supra.
OINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035(b), which reads:
If the decedent within a period of 3 years ending with the date of his death
(except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power,
or exercised or released a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment,
exercise, or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made
in contemplation of death.
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ity property, with the wife paying for the policy from her separate funds,
could be effective to vest absolute ownership of the policy in the husband.'
In the absence of a partition, the only other effective means would seem to
be a gift by the husband to the wife of his one-half of community property, from which she could then purchase the policy, and make a gift back
to the husband (valid because the property would be separate). Gift tax,
of course, would be due on both transactions. But a "Dear Marty" letter,
expressing a gift transaction, would of itself probably not be effective.
Mortimer's final argument that the Commissioner's position, if affirmed,
would frustrate the national policy of tax equalization was thoroughly rejected by the court. The decision makes it quite clear that by virtue of
the nature of their ownership, community property residents are not to be
treated the same as are the residents of common law jurisdictions when it
comes to the estate taxation of life insurance policies.
W.R.J.

Estate Taxation - Determination of the Marital Deduction After a Statutory Renunciation
At testator's death the widow's interest in the deceased's estate as provided by the will qualified for the marital deduction under section 2056 (a)
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. With "callous disregard" for estate tax
consequences the widow elected to renounce the will and take her dower
in lands and her share in the personal estate.' However, after the renunciation was filed within the statutory period, the attorney for the executors
advised them that he was uncertain of the widow's rights under Montana
law. Therefore, an agreement was reached between the executors and the
widow, under which she was to receive certain real estate in fee, and the
probate court entered a decree of distribution based on the agreement. The
marital deduction was calculated by the executors (plaintiffs in this suit)
on the basis of the decree, i.e., on the basis of the property actually received
by the widow. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency, contending that
the widow's interest should be determined on the basis of the rights given
her upon the renunciation under Montana law, which included a life estate
in the lands and thus a terminable, non-qualifying interest under section
2056(b) (1) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. To support its position,
the Commissioner argued that the deduction is allowable only as to interests
passing from the decedent. It was asserted that the election to renounce by
operation of law occurs at death; hence as of the date of death the widow
had a terminable interest in the real estate and the non-terminable interest
passed to her not from the decedent but from the other heirs as a trade of
assets. The executors paid the deficiency and filed for refund. Held: The
7

TEx. REV. CI'N. STAT. ANN.

'MONT.

art. 4624(a)

REV. CODES ANN. S 22-107 (1967).

(1968).
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marital deduction is to be computed on the basis of the interest actually
distributed to the widow. The agreement and decree of distribution are the
measure of rights passing to the widow by virtue of law. Stephens v. United
States, 270 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mont. 1967).
The court regarded the language of section 2056 to mean that where
a distribution is based upon statutory rights following an election to renounce, the marital deduction is to be based upon the quality and quantity
of rights actually received by the widow. With two observations the court
refuted the government's contention that once the statutory election was
made, her rights were then fixed under Montana law: (1) An election is
not necessarily final since it can be withdrawn as a matter of right; (2)
there is a possibility that the estate may be converted into cash prior to the
distribution of the estate.! The court also rejected the government's reasoning that because the renunciation by operation of law occurs on the date of
death, the rights of the widow become fixed by the election to renounce.
The court found nothing in the law which gives the date of renunciation
the same finality as that of the date of death in the ordinary marital deduction case.' The court reasoned that if one post-death act could alter the
marital deduction there is no reason why another act could not alter the
first change.
To support its finding that the agreement which ultimately was the basis
of the decree of distribution was to be regarded as a measurement of the
rights passing by law to the widow, the court relied upon two cases. In
Dougherty v. United States4 a similar situation had arisen when a widow
elected to take her dower but the dower was reduced to a sum certain before the distribution. The Sixth Circuit held that the property had passed
at the date of death from the decedent to his spouse since the court was
more concerned with the interests actually received rather than what she
was technically entitled to receive. In an earlier case' the United States Supreme Court had expressed a basic thought underlying the determination
of the interests passing by virtue of law. In Dougherty and in the present
case the court had noted that a distinction sought to be made between acquisition through a judgment and acquisition by a compromise agreement
in lieu of such a judgment was "too formal to be sound."'
In Stephens the court correctly applied the existing law in concluding
that where a widow elects to renounce a will, her interests are not necessarily determined at the time of death but may be altered and the deduction should be determined on the basis of the rights actually received. To
hold otherwise would have produced a tax result unrelated to the economic
realities of the situation.
L.J.B.
a The court pointed out that where the land is not susceptible of division without great injury,

this may be done under MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 91-2610 to -2612 (1964).
3 Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1966); Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223
F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
4292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961).
'Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938) (upon compromise of a will contest, property held to
be an inheritance).
old. at 196.
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